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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 1, 2001, only days after taking office, President George W.
Bush announced the New Freedom Initiative, a proposal to "[tear] down the
barriers to equality" by increasing access to assistive technology for the 54
million Americans with disabilities.' In his comments, Bush described the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 as the "last great reform in this
cause." 2 "But there is more to do," Bush also said.3 Indeed, there is much
more to do, because even as President Bush is advocating for more efforts to
tear down barriers for the disabled, our judiciary is erecting a new barrier for
Americans who have disabilities.
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") provides
that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to...
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 4 In passing the ADA,
Congress intended to "provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities., 5
When the ADA became law, the term "disability" was defined broadly and
encompassed all individuals with non-trivial medical conditions, as well as
those who were unfairly regarded as being disabled.6 However, "disability"
is slowly being redefined in a way that excludes many from the ADA's
protections.
7
1. George W. Bush, Foreword to the New Freedom Initiative, at www.whitehouse.gov/news/
freedominitiative/freedominitiative.html (Feb. 1, 2001).
2. George W. Bush, Remarks Announcing the New Freedom Initiative, I PuB. PAPERS 44, 44
(Feb. 1,2001).
3. Id. at 45.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
6. See discussion infra Part V.
7. Id. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 202 (2002) (holding
that plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis was not disabled); Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 477 (1999) (plaintiffs with severe myopia not disabled); Furnish v. SVI
Sys. Inc., 270 F.3d 445,449-51 (7th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff who suffered from cirrhosis of the liver not
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The latest redefinition of disability occurred in January 2002, in the
Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.8 In Toyota, the Supreme Court set out a new,
more stringent test for determining if an individual is disabled and issued
dicta encouraging the lower courts to use an extremely high standard when
making this determination.9 The Toyota decision will dramatically limit the
number of Americans who qualify as disabled and therefore are protected by
the ADA.10 The decision is a landmark victory for employers, but will
impose significant hardships on employees who suffer from medical
conditions that limit their performance of everyday tasks."'
This case note analyzes the Toyota decision and its effects upon the
ADA. Part II outlines the ADA and the Supreme Court decisions that led up
to Toyota. Part III gives the facts of the case, and Part IV analyzes the
opinion itself and its bases of support. Part V critiques the opinion. Finally,
Part VI of this note discusses the future of ADA litigation after Toyota and
the decision's probable impact on the workplace.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. ADA Basics
The ADA was enacted in 1990 with strong bipartisan support in
Congress and the full support of the first Bush administration.'2 The stated
purpose of the ADA is to eliminate discrimination against persons with
disabilities and to allow those with disabilities, who have historically been
isolated and segregated, the opportunity to compete with other Americans on
an equal basis for employment and other opportunities. 13  Title I of the
ADA 14 drew heavily from and expanded upon sections 501, 503, and 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,15 which prohibited the federal government,
disabled); Webb v. Clyde L. Choate Mental Health & Dev. Ctr., 230 F.3d 991, 998-99 (7th Cir.
2000) (plaintiff with asthma and osteoporosis not disabled).
8. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 184.
9. Id. at 196-97.
10. See discussion infra Part VI.
1I. See discussion infra Part VI(B).
12. John W. Parry, Supreme Court Narrows and Expands ADA Disability Definition, 26
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 15, 15 (2002). The ADA passed the Senate by a 91-6
vote and the House of Representatives by a 377-28 vote. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2000).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000).
14. Title I of the ADA deals specifically with employment discrimination, Title II with public
services such as state and local governments, Title III with public accommodations such as
transportation, Title IV with telecommunications, and Title V with other miscellaneous issues. See
42 U.S.C. §§12101-213 (2000). This note focuses on Title I.
15. The ADA expanded upon the Rehabilitation Act by making many of its protections
applicable to all private sector employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and labor-
federal contractors, and recipients of federal funds from discriminating
against "handicapped individuals" in their employment decisions. 16
Specifically, the ADA took its definition of "disability" almost word for
word from the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "handicapped individual."' 7
To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the
ADA, a plaintiff must show that he or she a) is a disabled individual as
defined by the ADA, b) is a "qualified individual," and c) has suffered an
adverse employment decision because of the disability.' 8 There is no list of
covered disabilities.' 9 Instead, "disability" is identified on a case-by-case
basis by use of a three-prong test.20 Under this test, an individual is disabled
if he or she has either a) "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual," b) "a
record of such an impairment," or c) is "regarded as having such an
impairment."'" This article will deal primarily with the first prong of the
test, known as the actual disability prong, because that prong was at issue in
Toyota.22  Despite the ADA's use of the pre-existing and already-tested
Rehabilitation Act definition of disability, litigation regarding the actual
disability prong has produced "inconsistent and implausible" results. 23 The
management committees that have fifteen or more employees for at least twenty weeks out of each
calendar year. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), (5)(A) (2000); see also Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of
Disabilit" Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do
About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 92 (2000) (stating that due to efforts of political and
legal advocates, the meaning of disability was taken directly from the definition that applied to
sections 501, 503, and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791,793-94 (2000).
17. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 705(21)(A) (2000) (Rehabilitation Act) with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
(2000) (ADA). Congress also explicitly mandated that the ADA definition of disability be construed
in accordance with the pre-existing Rehabilitation Act interpretations of the term "handicapped
individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (2000) ("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in
this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such
title."); see also Feldblum, supra note 15, at 92 (stating that "one of the best 'selling points' of the
ADA was that Congress would simply be extending to the private sector the requirements of an
existing law, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act"). In 1992, the Rehabilitation Act was amended
to replace the term "handicap" with "disability." 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794(d) (2000). In addition, in
1992 Congress reversed the process and made the evolving ADA standards applicable to the
Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 7 9 1(g) (2000); Aurigue v. Potter, 45 Fed. Appx. 692, 693 (9th Cir.
2002) (stating that "Itihe standards under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ... apply to
Rehabilitation Act claims").
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000); Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 589 (6th Cir. 2002); Spades
v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 1999).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)-j) (outlining standards for
determining if an individual is disabled). Congress explicitly refused to list conditions that would
qualify as disabilities, insisting that the definition must be flexible and specific to each individual.
H.R. REP. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (2000).
21. Id. Many ADA plaintiffs argue that they are disabled under more than one of the three
prongs. See, e.g., Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 518-19 (1999) (arguing that plaintiff suffered
from an actual disability and, alternately, that plaintiff was regarded as being disabled).
22. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187 (2002).
23. Mark A. Rothstein et al., Using Established Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A
Proposal to Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 243-44 (2002).
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definition is difficult for courts to apply because it uses the subjective terms
"major" and "substantially limits."'24
The EEOC regulations interpreting Title I of the ADA provide guidance
for courts that must determine who qualifies as disabled by explaining the
terms "substantially limits" and "major life activity. ' 25  "Substantially
limited" means:
[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform; or [s]ignificantly restricted as to
the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can
perform a particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in
the general population can perform that same major life activity.26
According to the regulations, major life activities include "caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."27  In addition, the Supreme Court has
held that reproduction is a major life activity.28 The various circuit courts
have found that a variety of other activities, such as eating, social
functioning, thinking, and sleeping, are also major life activities.29
24. Id. at 244. However, the term "physical or mental impairment" generally does not present
the problem of subjectivity. The Code of Federal Regulations defines physical or mental impairment
as:
[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal,
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or [any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2002). This definition was also taken verbatim from the regulations
governing the Rehabilitation Act. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2002) (ADA) with 45 C.F.R. §
84.3(j)(2)(i) (2002) (Rehabilitation Act). The existence of an impairment is seldom an issue in ADA
cases. Often the parties will concede that the plaintiff is impaired and litigate only the "substantially
limited" and "major life activities" parts of the disability definition. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999) ("There is no dispute that petitioners are physically
impaired."); Toyota, 534 U.S. at 196 ("The parties do not dispute that respondent's medical
conditions ... amount to physical impairments.").
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)-(j)(1) (2002). The regulations interpreting Title I of the ADA were
issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") pursuant to statutory
authority. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000). They also closely mirror the regulations interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act issued by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"). See 45
C.F.R. § 84.30)(1) (2002).
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1) (2002). The regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act did not
contain a definition of "substantially limits" because the HEW believed that a definition of this term
was not possible when those regulations were issued. 45 C.F.R. Pt. 84, app. A, subpart A (2002).
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2002). This list is identical to the list in the regulations interpreting
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3j)(2)(ii) (2002).
28. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998).
29. Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2002) (lifting is a major life
activity); MX Group, Inc., v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 337 (6th Cir. 2002) (social
579
Although the statute's definition of disability is broad, the ADA does
take employers' legitimate business concerns into consideration. 30  The
ADA does not prohibit an employer from considering an individual's
abilities or disabilities, nor does it mandate that all disabled individuals be
offered employment.3' Instead, it balances the importance of utilizing
disabled persons' talents and abilities with employers' business concerns by
requiring that a disabled individual be "qualified" for the job.32 An
individual is qualified if he or she can perform all of the "essential"
functions of the job either with or without "reasonable accommodation. 3 3 If
an individual is both disabled and qualified, then the protections of the ADA
attach and an employer must provide "reasonable accommodation" to allow
the disabled individual to hold the position.34 An employer is never required
to employ a person who is not qualified for the position, to provide
accommodations that would create undue hardship for the employer,35 or to
modify any "essential" job functions in order to accommodate a person's
disability.36
functioning and parenting); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2001)
(eating); Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492, 496 (10th Cir. 2000) (sleeping); McAlindin v.
County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999) (interacting with others); Taylor v.
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999) (thinking); Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d
1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999) (sleeping); Colwell v. Suffolk Co. Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 643 (2d
Cir. 1998) (sleeping).
30. Molly M. Joyce, Note, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Fallen on Deaf Ears? A
Post-Sutton Analysis of Mitigating Measures in the Seventh Circuit, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389,
1394 (2002).
31. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999) ("By its terms, the ADA
allows employers to prefer some physical attributes over others and to establish physical criteria.").
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2002). In determining what job
functions are "essential," courts defer to the employer, considering the employer's assessment of
what is essential and any written job description. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(ii) (2002). Regular
work attendance is generally an essential job function. Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673, 682 (8th Cir.
2002). A task may be essential even if it could potentially be reassigned if the employer believes
that it is better performed by that employee. Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 929-30 (7th Cir.
2001) (holding that delivering medication is essential to pharmacy technician job even though other
employees could have performed the task). Furthermore, a job function need not consume a large
amount of an employee's time to be essential. Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 513
(7th Cir. 2001) (holding that handling safety calls was an essential job function even though it
consumed only five percent of the employee's time at work).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). Reasonable accommodations may include, but are not
limited to the following: 1) "making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities," 2) job restructuring, 3) part time or modified work
schedules, 4) modifying equipment or acquiring new equipment, 5) modifying examinations,
training materials, or policies, and 6) providing readers or interpreters. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000). Whether an accommodation creates an "undue hardship"
is determined by considering the cost and nature of the accommodation, the size and financial
resources of the employer as a whole and the particular facility at which the person is employed, and
the impact that the accommodation may have on the facility. Id.
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000) (stating that an individual is not "qualified" if he or she
cannot perform all essential job functions).
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B. Recent pre-Toyota ADA case law both expanded and dramatically
limited who is considered disabled.
1. In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Court increased the number of individuals
protected by the ADA by interpreting "major life activity" very
broadly.
When the Supreme Court decided the 1998 case of Bragdon v. Abbott,37
scholars and newspapers alike heralded it as a landmark, pro-plaintiff
decision.3 8 In Bragdon, plaintiff Sidney Abbott, who was HIV positive,
went to see Dr. Randon Bragdon for a dental exam. 39  Bragdon found a
cavity in Abbott's tooth but refused to fill it in his office because Abbott was
HIV positive.40 He offered to fill the cavity at a hospital instead.41 Abbott
declined to have the cavity filled at the hospital and sued for discrimination
under the ADA.42
Bragdon specifically held that HIV infection is a disability under the
ADA even during its asymptomatic stages.43 In making this determination,
the Supreme Court applied the three-step process outlined in the ADA
itself.44 The Court first reviewed the effects of the HIV virus on the body
and concluded that HIV infection is an impairment.45 Next, the Court
determined that HIV infection affects the major life activity of
reproduction.46 Finally, the Court decided that HIV's effect on reproduction
was "substantial" because an infected woman who reproduces has a 25%
chance of transmitting the virus to the child.47  Therefore, the Court
determined that Abbott was disabled and protected by the ADA.48  The
37. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
38. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99,99-101 (1999).
39. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628.
40. Id. at 629.
41. Id.
42. Id. Abbott sued under Title III of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination in public
accommodations. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182). Bragdon is relevant precedent for Toyota because
the definition of disability is the same under all five titles of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102
(2000).
43. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
44. ld. at 631.
45. Id. at 637. The Court described the effects of the virus on the body and the progression of
the disease in great detail. Id. at 633-37.
46. Id. at 637.
47. Id. at 639-40. Antiretroviral drug therapy can reduce the risk of infecting the child to 8%.
Id. at 640. The Court indicated that an 8% risk would still constitute a substantial limitation. Id. at
641.
48. Id. at 641.
Court noted that this result was supported by the interpretative regulations
promulgated by both the Department of Justice and the EEOC.4 9
Bragdon's greatest significance is in its analysis of "major life
activity., 50 The suggested major life activity at issue was reproduction,51
which is not an activity listed in the relevant Rehabilitation Act
regulations.5 2 However, the Court stated that the list in the regulations was
merely illustrative, not exhaustive.53 The Court had "little difficulty"
determining that reproduction is a major life activity, stating that
"reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life
process itself."54 The Court reasoned that the word "major" was a broad
term.55 Furthermore, nothing in the definition of disability implied that a
major life activity must be "public, economic, or daily" in nature.5 6
After Bragdon, it appeared that the Court would define disability very
broadly.57 After all, in order to invoke the ADA's protections, the Court had
engaged in what one scholar subsequently described as a "bizarre" inquiry
into the reproductive limitations of an individual who was discriminated
against in the completely unrelated area of dental care.58 It appeared that the
Court intended to define disability to protect as many people as possible,
including those with non-traditional disabilities.59
2. The 1999 Sutton trilogy sharply reduced the number of individuals
who are considered disabled by interpreting "substantially limits"
very narrowly.
On June 22, 1999, the Supreme Court handed down three decisions that
dramatically limited the number of people who qualify as "disabled" under
the ADA.6° In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that
49. Id. at 646-47. Like the EEOC has the authority to issue regulations pursuant to Title I of the
ADA, the Department of Justice has authority to promulgate regulations interpreting Titles II and III
of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2000) (Title II); 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2000) (Title III).
50. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628.
51. Id. at 638.
52. Id. at 638-39 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997) and 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1997)).
The Court acknowledged here that the Rehabilitation Act regulations were binding because Congress
specifically incorporated them into the ADA. Id. at 638.
53. Id. at 639.
54. id. at 638.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Katherine R. Annas, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams: Part of an
Emerging Trend of Supreme Court Cases Narrowing the Scope of the ADA, 81 N.C. L. REV. 835,
840-41 (2003).
58. Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment
Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 331
(2001).
59. See Colker, supra note 38, at 99 ("[I]t was now clear that the 'law would also cover other
conditions.., including infertility, well-controlled diabetes, and cancer that is in remission after
treatment."') (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Ruling on Bias Law: Infected People Can Be Covered
Even With No Symptoms Present, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1998, at Al).
60. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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the determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major
life activity must be made "with reference to measures that mitigate the
individual's impairment.",61 United Airlines had refused to hire the Sutton
plaintiffs as pilots because of their extremely poor uncorrected vision.62
However, with glasses or contacts, both plaintiffs had 20/20 vision.63 The
Supreme Court held that the Sutton plaintiffs were not disabled under the
ADA because, with correction, their poor vision did not substantially limit
them in any major life activity. 64  The Court reasoned that the term
"substantially limits" is a present indicative verb, which requires a present
substantial limitation, not a "potentia[l] or hypothetica[l]" one.65 The Court
also relied heavily on the congressional finding of fact accompanying the
ADA that there are 43 million Americans with disabilities. 66  The Court
observed that more than 100 million Americans have vision impairments
requiring corrective lenses67 and stated that "[h]ad Congress intended to
include all persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered
by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number of
disabled persons in the findings. 68 In holding that corrective measures must
be considered, the Court explicitly declined to follow the EEOC
interpretation of the Act, which specifically states that mitigating measures
should not be considered in determining if an individual is disabled.69 In a
bit of very significant dictum, the Court also questioned whether working is
a major life activity. 0 However, since the case did not turn on resolution of
that issue, the Court only noted that "there may be some conceptual
difficulty in defining 'major life activities' to include work," and expressly
reserved judgment on that question.7' Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented
in Sutton, stating that "in order to be faithful to the remedial purpose of the
61. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999).
62. Id. at 475-76. Petitioners' uncorrected vision was 20/200 or worse in their right eyes, and
20/400 or worse in their left eyes. Id. at 475.
63. Id. Petitioners met the United Airlines requirements for pilots in all other respects, clearly
making them "qualified individuals" under the ADA. See id. at 475-76. In addition, it was clear that
United's refusal to hire the petitioners was based on their eyesight, not on some other factor. See id.
at 476.
64. Id. at 488-89.
65. Id. at 482.
66. Id. at 484-85 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l)).
67. Id. at 487 (citing the NATIONAL ADVISORY EYE COUNCIL, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, VISION RESEARCH-A NATIONAL PLAN: 1999-2003, 7 (1998)).
68. Id. at 487.
69. Id. at 481 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2Q) (1998)). In so holding, the Court also
disregarded the legislative history of the ADA, which states that mitigating measures should not be
considered. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 23 (1989). However, the Court stated that the plain language of
the statute could not be read to exclude consideration of mitigating measures and therefore declined
to consider the ADA's legislative history. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
70. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.
71. Id. This issue resurfaced in Toyota, and the Court again expressly declined to decide the
matter. See discussion infra, Part V.
583
Act, we should give it a generous, rather than a miserly, construction. 72
The dissent examined the legislative history of the statute and found ample
evidence that Congress intended to assess the existence of disability without
regard to mitigating measures.73
In Sutton's companion cases, Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg74 and
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,7 the Court applied Sutton's basic
holding, that mitigating measures must be considered in determining if an
individual is disabled, to additional fact patterns. In Albertson's, the
Supreme Court held that the human body's own ability to compensate for a
physical or mental impairment must be considered in determining if a person
is disabled.76 The Court reasoned that Kirkingburg's impairment, monocular
vision-using only one eye to see, was not a disability because his other eye
was able to compensate.77 Therefore, Kirkingburg's monocular vision was
simply a difference in the manner of seeing, not a substantial limitation on
the major life activity of seeing. 8 In Murphy, the Court held that medication
was a mitigating measure that must be considered in determining if a person
is disabled.79 Murphy suffered from severe hypertension that was partially
controlled by medication.80 The Court held that Murphy's medication was a
mitigating measure that must be considered even though it only partly
corrected his condition and caused additional negative side effects.81
Following the Sutton trilogy, it is very difficult for an individual to
qualify as "disabled" if the individual's impairment can be mitigated in any
way.82 Applying Sutton, lower courts have found, among other things, that
72. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 499-500. Justice Stevens cited the Senate and House Committee Reports. Id. The
Senate Committee Report on the ADA states that "whether a person has a disability should be
assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures." S. REP. No. 101 -116, at 23
(1989). The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary states that "[t]he impairment should be
assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable
accommodations, would result in a less-than-substantial limitation." H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III,
at 28 (1990).
74. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
75. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
76. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999) ("We see no principled basis
for distinguishing between measures undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and devices,
and measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body's own systems.").
77. Id. at 564-65.
78. Id.
79. Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999).
80. Id. at 519-20. Murphy had suffered from hypertension since the age of ten. Id. at 519. His
unmedicated blood pressure was 250/160. Id. Justice Stevens's dissent noted that without
medication Murphy would probably be hospitalized. Id. at 525 (Stevens, J., dissenting). With
medication, his blood pressure was 186/124, which was still high enough to disqualify him from the
Department of Transportation health certification required by his employer. Id. at 519.
81. Id.at519-21.
82. Rothstein et al., supra note 23, at 255-56. For further discussion of the Sutton trilogy, see
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to
the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321 (2000) (discussing the effects of the Sutton trilogy); Wendy E.
Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning of
Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 71 (2000) (arguing that the Sutton trilogy reflects an
increase in "plain meaning" statutory interpretation); Mark R. Freitas, Closing the Floodgates: The
584
[Vol. 31: 575, 2004] Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
depression with suicidal tendencies," epilepsy, 84 and diabetes15 are not
disabilities.
3. Recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has further limited who
the ADA protects.
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the
Supreme Court held that state governments cannot be sued under the ADA
for employment discrimination.86 The Court reasoned that, in enacting Title
I of the ADA, Congress did not intend to abrogate the states' constitutional
immunity from lawsuits.87 While Garrett was an Eleventh Amendment case
and did not directly interpret the ADA,88 its result is that 4,758,000 state
employees, or 3.4% of the workforce, are no longer protected by the ADA.8 9
III. SUMMARY OF FACTS
Ella Williams began working at Toyota's automobile manufacturing
plant in 1990.90 She initially worked on an engine fabrication assembly line
that required use of pneumatic tools.9t Using these tools caused Williams
pain in her hands, wrists, and arms. 9' She was diagnosed with bilateralcarpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendonitis,93 and as a result her doctor
Employee's Duty to Mitigate and Why Working Is Not a Major Life Activity, 19 REV. LITIG. 465,
477-82 (2000) (discussing the effects of the Sutton trilogy and arguing that working cannot be a
major life activity); Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 58, at 310-11 (arguing that the Sutton trilogy
reveals a tension between nondiscrimination and redistributive policies).
83. Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F.3d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 1999).
84. Todd v. Acad. Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 454 (S.D. Tex. 1999). The Todd plaintiff's
epilepsy was controlled by medication so that he experienced seizures only about one time each
week for between five and fifteen seconds. Id. at 453. Because the seizures were "light" and
petitioner was aware of them before they occurred, he was not disabled. Id. at 453-54.
85. Epstein v. Kalvin-Miller Int'l, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 222, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
86. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001). However, at least four
state legislatures, Minnesota, Rhode Island, California, and New York, have either passed or
attempted to pass legislation waiving this immunity. Frank C. Morris, Jr. & Teresa L. Jakubowski,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Current Developments, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUC., July 25-27, 2002, at 37, 8 1.
87. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
88. Id. at 363.
89. Leon Friedman, Employment Discrimination and Civil Rights Actions: Key Supreme Court
Decisions, 2002 Term, 2001 Term, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDuc., Feb. 14-16, 2002, at
1,5.
90. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187 (2002).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Carpal tunnel syndrome occurs when the median nerve in the wrist becomes compressed,
usually as a result of repetitive motion and constant flexing of the wrist tendons. NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL AND THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MUSCULOSKELETAL DISORDERS AND THE
WORKPLACE: Low BACK AND UPPER EXTREMITIES 230 (2001). Tendonitis is inflammation of the
tendons. Id. at 196. Almost two million people report having carpal tunnel syndrome each year and
restricted the types of work that she could perform.94 The doctor advised
that she should never lift more than twenty pounds, frequently lift or carry
smaller objects, perform overhead work, do work requiring constant
repetitive motion of the wrists or elbows, or use vibratory or pneumatic
tools. 95 For the next two years, Toyota attempted to accommodate these
restrictions by assigning Williams to modified duty jobs.96 Nevertheless,
Williams took some medical leave and eventually filed a workers'
compensation claim, which was settled. 97 Williams returned to work as part
of the settlement, but was unsatisfied with Toyota's accommodation of her
medical restrictions.98 She then brought a lawsuit against Toyota alleging
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which was also settled.99
Following the settlement, Williams again returned to work and was
placed in the Quality Control Inspection Operations ("QCIO")
department.' l °  The QCIO team handled four tasks.1 '' Williams was
assigned to do two of the four tasks and rotated weekly between them.l12 In
the "assembly paint" position, she visually inspected newly painted cars for
flaws in the paint job.'0 3  Williams' second task was "paint second
inspection," which required her to wipe each newly painted car with a glove
as it moved down a conveyor belt.' °4 Williams performed these two tasks
from December 1993 until the fall of 1996, and all parties agreed that her
performance was "satisfactory."'' 5
In 1996, Toyota decided that all QCIO employees should perform all
four of the department's tasks. 10 6 As a result, the "shell body audit" task was
an additional 588,000 report tendonitis or similar disorders. id. at 54. About one percent of those
individuals who experience carpal tunnel develop permanent injuries. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS AND STROKE, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, NINDS Carpal
Tunnel Syndrome Information Page, at http://www.ninds.nih.gov/health-andmedical/disorders/
carpal-doc.htm. The vast majority have no permanent impairment and can vary their performance
of tasks so as to avoid recurring injuries. Id. Compelling testimony as to the more severe effects of
carpal tunnel syndrome, tendonitis, and similar disorders can be found in the records of testimony
before the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in 2000, at
http://www.osha.gov/doc/accsh/transcripts/accsh09l4OOtranscript.html. For a good discussion of the
ADA's treatment of carpal tunnel syndrome pre-Toyota, see Kathleen M. Sheil, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: Are Your Wrists Protected?, 23 J. CORP. L. 325 (1998).
94. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 187.
95. Id. at 187-88.
96. Id. at 188.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. When Williams was first assigned to QCIO, this task included opening and shutting the
doors, trunk, and hood of each car. Id. At some point the task was modified to eliminate these
duties. Id. However, there is no indication that this modification was made to accommodate
Williams. See id.
104. Id. at 188-89.
105. Id. at 189.
106. Id.
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added to Williams' rotation. 7 This task required her to apply a highlight oil
to various parts of each car as it passed by on a conveyor belt.'0 8 Applying
the oil required Williams to hold her arms up at shoulder height for extended
periods of time, which caused her pain in her neck and shoulders."°9 After
seeking medical advice,"0 Williams requested that she be allowed to return
to performing only the "assembly paint" and "paint second inspection"
tasks.'
What happened next is unclear." 2 Williams claimed that Toyota refused
to accommodate her limitations and forced her to continue performing the
"shell body audit" task, which exacerbated her injuries." 3 Toyota claimed
that Williams began missing work regularly. 1 4 All parties agree that on
December 6, 1996, the last day that she went to work, Williams' doctor
placed her under a no-work-of-any-kind order." 5  Toyota subsequently
terminated Williams' employment on January 27, 1997, ostensibly for poor
attendance."1
6
Williams sued Toyota claiming that it had violated the ADA by refusing
to reasonably accommodate her disability. 117 Williams claimed that she was
disabled because she suffered from physical impairments that substantially
limited her in the major life activities of performing manual tasks, lifting,
working, gardening, doing housework, and playing with children." 8  The
trial court agreed that performing manual tasks, lifting, and working are
major life activities. 119 However, the court found that Williams was not
disabled because her impairments did not "substantially limit" her ability to
perform manual tasks, lift, or work. 20  Speaking specifically to the life
activity of performing manual tasks, the court found that Williams' claim of
disability was "irretrievably contradicted by [Williams'] continual insistence
107. id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Williams was diagnosed with myotendinitis bilateral periscapular, myotendinitis and
myositis bilateral forearms with nerve compression causing median nerve irritation, and thoracic
outlet compression. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 189-90.
116. Id. at 190.
117. Id. Williams also alleged violations of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act and the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993. Id.
118. Id. In addition, Williams unsuccessfully argued that she was disabled under either the second
or third prong of the disability test. Id. See supra, Part II(A) for a discussion of the three prongs
under which an ADA plaintiff may qualify as disabled.
119. Id. at 688.
120. id. Toyota did not argue that Williams did not suffer from a physical impairment. Id.
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that she could perform the tasks in assembly and paint inspection without
difficulty."12'
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Williams was
disabled because she was substantially limited in the major life activity of
performing manual tasks. 22 In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit
looked to Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., in which the Supreme Court held
that to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, an
individual must be unable to perform a "class" of jobs. 123  The court then
applied this class-based analysis to the major life activity of performing
manual tasks and found that Williams was substantially limited in her ability
to perform the class of manual tasks required for her job and similar jobs. 24
Therefore, Williams was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
25
IV. THE COURT'S OPINION
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide what a plaintiff must
show in order to establish a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
performing manual tasks. 126  Justice O'Connor delivered the unanimous
opinion of the court. 27 Justice O'Connor began by noting that there are two
potential sources of guidance in interpreting the ADA's definition of
"disability."'' 28 The first of these sources is the regulations interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.129 These regulations are a clear source of
authority because Congress drew the ADA definition of "disability" directly
from the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "handicapped individual," and
"Congress' repetition of a well-established term generally implies that
Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing
regulatory interpretations. '130 Furthermore, Congress explicitly adopted the
Rehabilitation Act regulations in the statutory language of the ADA.'13 The
second potential source of authority is the EEOC regulations interpreting the
121. Id.
122. Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc.. 224 F.3d 840, 843-45 (6th Cir. 2000).
123. Id. at 843 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,491-92 (1999)).
124. Id. In finding that Williams was unable to perform this class of manual tasks, the Sixth
Circuit noted that "[Williams'] set of impairments to her arms, shoulders and neck ... are analogous
to having missing, damaged or deformed limbs." Id.
125. Id.
126. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 192 (2002). The Ninth Circuit case
of Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, 261 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2001), may also have influenced the
Court's decision to grant certiorari. Thornton reached the opposite result from the Sixth Circuit
Toyota on comparable facts. See Thornton, 261 F.3d at 792-93. After the Supreme Court handed
down Toyota, the Ninth Circuit issued a supplementary order affirming its original judgment but
giving different reasoning. Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 292 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002).
127. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 187.
128. Id. at 193.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 193-94 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998); FDIC v. Philadelphia
Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437-38 (1986); ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 (1945)).
131. Id. at 193-94 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994)).
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ADA.1 32  The Court stated that the "persuasive authority of the EEOC
regulations is less clear" because "no agency has been given authority to
issue regulations interpreting the term 'disability' in the ADA."' 133 However,
since the parties did not contest the validity of the EEOC regulations, the
134Court did not decide the level of deference that they should be given.
The Court's inquiry into whether Williams was disabled was guided
"first and foremost" by the words of the ADA itself.3 5 In interpreting each
of the words and phrases used by the statute to define "disability," the Court
drew from Webster's dictionary definitions. 3 6 The Court first addressed the
meaning of "substantially limits.' ' 137  Since substantially means
"considerable" or "to a large degree," the Court concluded that "impairments
that interfere in only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks" are
not disabilities. 38  Since the word "major" means "important," the phrase
"major life activities" encompasses only activities "of central importance to
daily life.' ' 139 The Court then combined these two definitions and concluded
that in order to have a disability based on the major life activity of
performing manual tasks, a plaintiff must "have an impairment that prevents
or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central
importance to most people's daily lives."' 40 "The impairment's impact also
must be permanent or long term."' 4' The Court opined that "these terms
need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying
as disabled."'' 42 The Court's basis for this opinion was Congress' findings of
132. Id. at 193.
133. Id. The EEOC has statutory authority to promulgate regulations interpreting only Title I of
the ADA, which is found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000) ("[Tihe
Commission shall issue regulations in an accessible format to carry out this subchapter .... ). The
overarching definition of "disability," which applies to Titles I-V of the ADA, is found in 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102, a separate definitional section that precedes Title I. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2000).
Therefore, the EEOC has not been given authority to define "disability" as used in section 12102.
The Court previously addressed this issue in Sutton and concluded, as it did in Toyota, that there was
no need to decide what deference was due to the regulations. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471,480 (1999). Justice Breyer's Sutton dissent responded to the majority's questioning of the
EEOC regulations by noting that the EEOC is authorized to promulgate regulations for Title I of the
ADA, and that Title I also uses the word "disability." Id. at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Therefore,
in Justice Breyer's view, even if the EEOC lacks authority to issue regulations as to the meaning of
"disability" in the ADA's overarching definitional section, it certainly has authority to define
"disability" as used in Title I. Id.
134. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 194.
135. Id. at 196.
136. Id. at 196-97. The Court used Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1976). Id.
137. id. at 196.
138. Id. at 196-97.
139. Id. at 197. Individual manual tasks may be of "central importance to daily life" standing
alone. Id. Alternatively, a number of manual tasks which individually are not of "central
importance to daily life" may, in the aggregate, meet this standard. Id.
140. Id. at 198. (emphasis added).
141. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii) (2001)).
142. Id. at 197.
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fact accompanying the ADA. 43  Since Congress found that there are 43
million disabled Americans, the Court concluded that Congress did not
intend to include individuals who have difficulty performing "isolated" or
"unimportant" manual tasks.' 44
The Court next reiterated the well-settled proposition that existence of a
disability must be determined on a case-by-case basis.145  The Court
reasoned that individualized assessment is mandated by the fact that
Congress defined disability "with respect to an individual."' 146 The Court
also found support for individualized evaluation in the EEOC regulations
interpreting the ADA.147  Therefore, since an individualized assessment is
required, the Court stated that a mere medical diagnosis of impairment is
never sufficient to establish the existence of a disability. 48  Furthermore,
individual assessment is necessary because the effects of certain medical
impairments vary greatly from person to person. 49 The Court explained that
one of Williams' impairments, carpal tunnel syndrome, is a good example of
an impairment in which symptoms vary greatly from person to person.
50
In the Court's view, the Sixth Circuit erred in two crucial ways.'15  First,
the circuit court erroneously interpreted the 1999 Sutton decision as standing
for the proposition that a class-based analysis should be used to determine
the existence of a disability in the major life activity of performing manual
tasks. 52 The Court stated that "[n]othing in the text of the Act, our previous
opinions, or the regulations suggests that a class-based framework should
apply outside the context of the major life activity of working."'' 53 However,
the Court was also quick to add that the Court had not decided that working
143. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)).
144. Id. (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487 (1999)).
145. Id. at 198 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483; Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566
(1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998)).
146. Id. at 198 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)).
147. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (2001) ("The determination of whether an
individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the
person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual.")).
148. Id. at 197. Using medical criteria to determine whether an individual is disabled would make
the definition less subjective, which would make it easier for both employers and employees to
predict who the courts would find to be disabled. Rothstein et al., supra note 23, at 244. The
Rothstein article is a well-reasoned argument that medical standards can be used to define disability
in a way that accomplishes the case-by-case evaluation mandated by the ADA, while also providing
more predictability in the disability determination. See Rothstein, et al., supra note 23.
149. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 199.
150. Id. Symptoms of mild carpal tunnel syndrome include numbness and tingling, while severe
cases can involve muscle atrophy. Id. Twenty-five percent of all cases last only one month, but
22% last for eight years or longer. Id.
151. Id. at 199-201.
152. Id. at 199. Sutton held that when an individual claims substantial limitation in the major life
activity of working, the individual must allege that he or she cannot work in a "broad class" of jobs.
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999). The Sutton Court also held that inability
to work in a specific job of one's choice is not a substantial limitation on the major life activity of
working. Id. at 492.
153. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200.
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is a major life activity at all, and noted that there are "conceptual difficulties
inherent in the argument.'
'
,
54
Second, the circuit court focused only on the effect that Williams'
impairment had on her ability to perform manual tasks at work.'55 By
focusing only on manual tasks performed at work rather than all manual
tasks, a plaintiff would be able to recast the inability to do one specific job,
which is not a disability under the Sutton reasoning, 156 as a disability in
performing a class of manual tasks, thus circumventing Sutton's holding.
57
Instead, the circuit court should have focused on whether Williams was able
to perform tasks "central to most people's daily lives," both at work and
outside of work. 58  For example, it should have considered the fact that
Williams could brush her teeth, wash her face, bathe, care for a flower
garden, fix meals, and do laundry as evidence of her ability to perform tasks
central to most people's lives. 59 Although her impairments caused her to
avoid sweeping, quit dancing, occasionally seek help in dressing, and reduce
her gardening, driving, and playing with her children, "these changes in her
life did not amount to such severe restrictions in the activities that are of
central importance to most people's daily lives that they establish[ed] a
manual task disability as a matter of law.'16° Furthermore, the Court stated
that "occupation-specific tasks may have only limited relevance to the
manual task inquiry" because the tasks necessary to perform a specific job
are not necessarily central to most people's lives.' 6 1  In Williams' case,
"'repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels
for extended periods of time' is not an important activity to most people. 62
154. Id. The Court also expressly declined to reach this issue in Sutton. In that case, the Court
assumed, without deciding, that working was a major life activity. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. For a
discussion of the potential conceptual difficulties in the major life activity of working, see infra, Part
V.
155. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200.
156. See infra note 152.
157. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200-01. Between Sutton and Toyota, most lower courts handled claims
of disability caused by carpal tunnel syndrome by analyzing the major life activity of working.
Maria Greco Danaher, U.S. Supreme Court: Inability to Perform Certain Tasks is not "Disability"
Under ADA, LAW. J., February 8, 2002, at II. These courts determined that carpal tunnel only limits
the employee in one type of job, and therefore decided that there was no substantial limit on the
major life activity of working. Id. The Sixth Circuit's focus on the major life activity of performing
manual tasks instead of working was an end run around that usual analysis. Id.
158. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200-01.
159. Id. at 202.
160. Id. The opinion is unclear, however, on whether these restrictions were insufficient because
they were not severe enough, because these particular manual tasks are not central to most people's
daily lives, or both. See John W. Borkowski et al., The 2001-2002 Term of the United States
Supreme Court and Its Impact on Public Schools, WEST'S EDUC. L. REP., Sept. 12, 2002, at I, 17
(stating that the Court provided little guidance on what constitutes a "major life activity").
161. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 201.
162. Id. (quoting Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Therefore, Williams' inability to perform these work related tasks was
insufficient to establish a manual task disability. 63
V. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S OPINION
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Toyota is difficult to
reconcile with Bragdon v. Abbott, 64 it is a logical continuation of the trend,
begun in the Sutton trilogy, toward limiting the protections of the ADA.
165
Toyota demonstrates that the Court will not necessarily follow or defer to the
EEOC's interpretation of the ADA or its regulations enforcing the Act. 16 6 It
also shows that the Court intends to interpret the ADA narrowly even if this
requires the Court to disregard both the history and the precedent behind the
statute. 
67
A. The Court failed to consider the legislative history of the ADA.
Justice O'Connor's statement that ADA terms must be interpreted
strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is "the
clearest statement to date from the Court that it will interpret the ADA
narrowly to conform with what it views as Congress' intention to protect
only individuals who are truly disabled."'' 68  However, numerous scholars
and authors have pointed out that the legislative history of the ADA does not
indicate that Congress intended for the Act to be interpreted narrowly. 169
The Toyota Court failed to consider the legislative history of the statute at
all, relying instead on Congress' one sentence finding of fact that there are
43 million individuals with disabilities. 70 In light of all the evidence
163. id.
164. Annas, supra note 57, at 839.
165. See Joseph A. Reinert & Marilyn A. Mahusky, U.S. Supreme Court Review: A Shifting
Landscape, VT. B.J., June, 2002 at 37-38.
166. See Michael Delikat, Discrimination Law Update, LITIG. & ADMIN. PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES, June 2002, at 49, 77-78. The Bragdon Court considered the EEOC regulations
persuasive, but the Sutton Court, like the Toyota Court, refused to defer to the EEOC. See
discussion supra, Part II. However, just months after Toyota in Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Echazabal,
the Court upheld EEOC regulations concerning the employers' "direct threat" defense to an ADA
claim without any comment whatsoever on the amount of deference the EEOC regulations were due.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 75 (2002).
167. See Delikat, supra note 166, at 77.
168. Id. at 76 (emphasis added); see also Thomas D. Colbridge, The Americans with Disabilities
Act: The Continuing Search for Meaning, 71 F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 27, 29, August 2002
(noting that the Court intends to read the language of the ADA to protect only those who are "truly"
and "substantially" limited).
169. See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 15. Professor Feldblum was legislative counsel with the
American Civil Liberties Union from 1988-91. Id. at 91 n.1. He was one of the lawyers who
negotiated and drafted the ADA. Id; see also Annas, supra note 57, at 846; Parmet, supra note 82, at
60; Tucker, supra note 82, at 322.
170. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002). The Court explored
the origin of this finding of fact in greater detail in Sutton, which is probably why this section of the
Toyota opinion is quite cursory. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1999).
The Sutton court relied on the same finding of fact even though it concluded that "the exact source of
the 43 million figure is not clear." Id. at 484. Professor Feldblum asserts that the decision to use the
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regarding congressional intent that was available to the Court, this single
sentence is scant evidence upon which to base an entire opinion.''
The legislative history and the plain language of the ADA both indicate
that Congress intended that "disability" be defined in the same way that the
phrase "individual with handicaps" was defined under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.172 When the ADA was passed, the courts defined "individual with
handicaps" very broadly. 173 In the 1987 case of School Board of Nassau
County, Florida. v. Arline, which was handed down just three years before
the ADA was passed, the Supreme Court interpreted the term "handicapped
individual" to include a plaintiff who had been hospitalized for tuberculosis
in 1957 and had suffered a relapse after many years in remission. 174 In 1987,
the broad definition of "handicapped individual" was so certain that the
school board even conceded that plaintiff Arline was part of the
Rehabilitation Act's protected class. 7 5  Following Arline, disability law
scholars believed that the definition was so broad that "any individual who
had been discriminated against because of any impairment" would be
included. 176 In addition, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
("HEW") interpreted "handicapped individual" broadly, as evidenced by the
following comment in the HEW's regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation
Act:
Comments suggested narrowing the definition [of handicapped
individual] in various ways. The most common recommendation
was that only "traditional" handicaps be covered. The Department
continues to believe, however, that it has no flexibility within the
statutory definition to limit the term to persons who have those
severe, permanent, or progressive conditions that are most
commonly regarded as handicaps.'77
The Senate Report on the ADA and the Congressional Record also
indicate that Congress intended to include a broad range of impairments,
number 43 million was made by a staff person, "took about ten minutes to make, and that its
implications for the definition of disability were never considered." Feldblum, supra note 15, at
154. In 1990, the 43 million figure represented over 17% of the U.S. population, which was
estimated at 248,709,873. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, http://www.census.gov. (last visited Aug. 24, 2003).
171. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 511 (noting that "a 'statement of congressional findings is a rather
thin reed upon which to base' a statutory construction") (quoting Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 260 (1994)) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
173. E.g., Feldblum, supra note 15, at 106-13; Parmet, supra note 82, at 60 ("[Tihe evidence that
the ADA's drafters and supporters understood the definition's potential breath is overwhelming.").
174. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 276 (1987).
175. Id.at281.
176. Feldblum, supra note 15, at 92.
177. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, subpart A (2002).
including many non-traditional disabilities, in the ADA's disability
definition. 78  The senators who supported the ADA believed that arthritis
was a covered disability.'79 HIV infection, even prior to the development of
symptoms or AIDS, was expressly included.' 80 Bending restrictions and
limited use of an arm due to stroke were referred to as disabilities during
Senate debate over the bill.' 8 ' Most significant to this article, carpal tunnel
syndrome was specifically cited as a disability by Senator Harkin, one of the
ADA's primary sponsors. 18  Only very minor conditions were cited as
examples of impairments that were not believed to be disabilities.'83 For
example, the Senate Report stated that an infected finger is not a
disability.' 84 Because it recognized that the scope of the term "disability"
was very broad, the legislature was careful to specifically exclude politically
disfavored conditions such as drug addiction,18 transvestites, 86 and certain
mental disorders like compulsive gambling, kleptomania, and sexual
behavior disorders from the definition. 1
87
Furthermore, the legislative history shows that Congress believed that
one of the ADA's primary purposes was to allow disabled persons to be
successfully included in the workforce, 8   and that "[r]easonable
accommodation [was] a key requirement" in accomplishing this objective. 89
However, the purposes of inclusion and accommodation are defeated by a
narrow definition of disability.190 If an individual with a physical or mental
limitation is not "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA, no reasonable
accommodation is required' 9' and the individual will often remain excluded.
Therefore, a broad definition of disability is necessary to carry out the
178. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S10711 (1990); 135 CONG. REC. S10722-23 (1989); 135 CONG.
REc. S4986 (1989); S. REP. No. 101-116 (1989).
179. 135 CONG. REC. S10711 (1989) ("It could be an elderly grandmother with arthritis, but
determined to fend for herself and live her retirement years in dignity.") (statement of Sen. Harkin,
one of the primary sponsors of the bill).
180. 135 CONG. REC. S 10722-23 (1989).
181. 135 CONG. REC. S4986 (1989).
182. Id.
183. See S. REP. 101-116, at 23 (1988).
184. Id.
185. 42U.S.C.§ 12114 (2000).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 12208 (2000).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2000).
188. "[T]his bill will help our country use an immense amount of talent, intelligence, and other
human resources which heretofore have been underestimated, underdeveloped, and underutilized."
136 CONG. REC. H2421-02 (1990) (statement of Rep. Luken). "[Olur economy can no longer afford
not to enlist the unique abilities and talents of people with disabilities." 135 CONG. REC. S 10791
(1989) (statement of Sen. Riegle).
189. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 33 (1990); see also S. REP. No. 101 -116, at 31-32.
190. See Feldblum, supra note 15, at 95-100 (arguing that a narrow definition of "disability" was
historically associated with dependency on the social welfare system, and that in a civil rights
context, like the ADA, a broader definition is more appropriate); Jennifer Lav, Conceptualizations of
Disabilitv and the Constitutionality of Remedial Schemes Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 197, 204-10 (2002) (arguing that the ADA uses a socio-political
concept of disability, which posits that disability comes from the failure of the environment to adjust
to the needs of impaired individuals rather that the individual's inability to fit into society).
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
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clearly stated congressional purposes of encouraging reasonable
accommodation and including as many disabled persons as possible in the
workforce. 1
92
The Toyota Court completely overlooked all of this evidence that
Congress intended a broad construction of the term "disability" and
erroneously concluded that a "demanding" standard was required. 193
B. The "severely restricted" test is a departure from precedent.
An additional difficultly with the Court's opinion is that the origin of the
"severely restricted" is unclear. This language is not found in the ADA, the
EEOC regulations, or any previous case law. 194  Both the ADA and the
EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA state that a disability is a substantial
limitation on a major life activity.' 95 It appears that the Toyota Court simply
accepted the more stringent "severely restricted" language urged by Toyota
in its brief, without giving any reason for this change.
196
The problem with this standard is that it is so high that if an individual is
impaired enough to qualify as disabled, he is also probably too impaired to
work at all. 197  As an amicus brief from the National Association of
Employment Lawyers observed, "it would be hard to imagine any plaintiff
meeting this standard who could then go on to prove, as is a plaintiff's
burden, that he or she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the
job they hold or desire."' 98 The "severely restricted" test also appears to be
in tension with the Court's holding in Bragdon v. Abbott.199 In Bragdon, the
Court stated that "[t]he Act [ADA] addresses substantial limitations on
major life activities, not utter inabilities. ' 2°  By adopting the "severely
192. See Feldblum, supra note 15, at 100-02 (arguing that a broader definition of "disability" is
more appropriate in a civil rights context like the ADA).
193. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
194. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) (2002); Albertson's. Inc.
v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1).
196. Compare Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 with Petitioner's Brief at *12, Toyota (No. 00-1089), 2001
WL 741092 ("[A] disabling impairment must be one that imposes severe restrictions on an
important, basic function in life.").
197. Annas, supra note 57, at 843 (stating that disabled individuals who use mitigating measures
cannot rely on the ADA to protect them from discrimination, even though they may still be too
disabled to work); Sheil, supra note 93, at 326 (stating that individuals with carpal tunnel syndrome
have not always qualified for ADA coverage, though they are in too much pain to work); Amicus
Brief of The National Employment Lawyers Association in support of Respondent at *24-25, Toyota
(No. 00-1089), 2001 WL 1023526; Amicus Brief of National Council on Disability in support of
Respondent at *5, Toyota, (No. 00-1089), 2001 WL 1023525 (noting the extreme consequences of
the elevated standard that a plaintiff must meet).
198. Amicus Brief of The National Employment Lawyers Association in support of Respondent at
24-25, Toyota (No. 00-1089), 2001 WL 1023526.
199. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998).
200. Id.
restricted" test, the Toyota Court moved away from the tried and true
"substantially limits" test and closer towards requiring "utter inability. '20'
C. The suggestion that working is not a major life activity is contrary to
precedent.
The Court again left unresolved the question, first raised in Sutton, of
whether working is a major life activity.20 2 The fact that the Court raised
this issue a second time suggests that at least some of the Justices think that
working is not a major life activity.20 3 In addition, the Court's statement that
there are "conceptual difficulties inherent in the argument that working
could be a major life activity" leaves a "potential time-bomb" in the Court's
reasoning.2°4  The Court briefly explained this supposed conceptual
difficulty in Sutton, saying that "it seems 'to argue in a circle to say that if
one is excluded, for instance, by reason of [an impairment, from working
with others] ... then that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the
question you're asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by reason of
handicap.' 2 0 5 In other words, the inability to work cannot logically be both
the cause of a disability and the result of the same disability; such reasoning
is circular.20 6
Assuming that there is a logical problem with working being a major
life activity, 20 7 the Court will encounter two problems if it wishes to decide,
at some point in the future, that working is not a major life activity. First,
precedent treats working as a major life activity. As the Toyota Court noted,
when the ADA was passed, Congress expressly incorporated the standards
of the Rehabilitation Act and "the regulations issued by Federal agencies
201. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198.
202. Id. at 200; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,492 (1999).
203. Duncan v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1117-18 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(Randolph, J., concurring); see also Parry, supra note 12, at 16.
204. Parry, supra note 12, at 16.
205. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. in Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v.
Arline, O.T. 1986, No. 85-1277, p. 15) (brackets in original).
206. Freitas, supra note 82, at 482 ("Clearly, the inability to work cannot also be the reason for the
exclusion. Such a concept creates a circular argument that was not intended in the ADA.").
207. This article's author does not think there is a logical difficulty. The argument that inability to
work cannot be both the cause and the result of the disability ignores the fact that inability to work is
only one of many results being disabled. In addition, inability to work is not really the cause of the
disability, it is a way in which we identify the existence of a disability. When an individual suffers
from a number of physical and mental impairments that separately would not rise to the level of
disability, but collectively cause a great enough interference with the individual's life to prevent
working, that individual is fairly considered disabled.
Professor Freitas contends that the argument is circular and posits two questions which he
believes illustrate the logical problems with the concept. Freitas, supra note 82, at 482. First, how
does an employer "reasonably accommodate" someone whose disability is in working. Id. Second,
how does one formulate clear standards so that employers can determine when inability to work rises
to the level of disability if the definition of a working disability is necessarily vague and specific to
the individual? Id. This author believes that Professor Freitas points out two practical, not logical,
problems. While there are admittedly many practical problems with the definition of disability,
since it is riddled with subjective terms and requires a case-by-case evaluation, to tangle oneself in
logical formalities misses the practical problems that are really at issue.
596
[Vol. 31: 575, 2004] Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
pursuant to such title" into the Act.208 Those very regulations list working
as a major life activity.209 Furthermore, in School Board of Nassau County,
Florida v. Arline, the Court accepted working as a major life activity and
rejected the argument that it was based on circular reasoning.210 In Arline,
the Court specifically stated "[t]he argument is not circular, however, but
direct., 21' More recently, in Bragdon v. Abbott the Court endorsed a list of
major life activities that included working.21 2 If the Court plans to hold that
working is not a major life activity in the future, it will need to somehow
explain away these precedents.
The second barrier to the Court holding that working is not a major life
activity is common sense. 2 3  Given that the average American spends a
minimum of eight hours each day working, and that most individuals must
work to provide for their basic needs, it is difficult to see how work could
not be both "major" and central to most people's daily lives.214
What is going on behind the Toyota Court's complete departure from
the history and precedent of the ADA? Commentators suggest that an
increase in textualism is propelling the Court in its current direction.1 5
Textualism is a method of interpretation that relies on the "plain meaning"
of the words being interpreted, rather than looking to other sources like
history, precedent, or interpretive regulations.2 6 The Court's inclination
towards textualism was evident, though not determinative, in the 1998
Bragdon decision." 7 The Court adopted a wholesale textualist approach in
both the 1999 Sutton21 8 and 2002 Toyota decisions.1 9
208. See id. at 689 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994)) (emphasis added); see also Colker,
supra note 38, at 134 (noting that Congress expressed its approval of the section 504 Rehabilitation
Act regulations by directly incorporating them into the ADA).
209. 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(ii) (2002).
210. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 n.10 (1987).
211. Id.
212. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998).
213. See Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 58, at 333 ("But if work is not a major life activity,
what else is a major life activity? ... [lit would be extremely peculiar for Congress to have brought
disability status within the rubric of employment discrimination law if working were not intended to
satisfy the threshold statutory definition."); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, One Defeat, One Victory
for Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 38 TRIAL 72, 73 (2002) (arguing that "since a major purpose of the ADA
was to end workplace discrimination," it makes no sense to then say that work is not a major life
activity).
214. E.E.O.C. v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 654 (5th Cir. 1999).
215. Cynthia Estlund, The Supreme Court's Labor and Employment Cases of the 2001-2002
Term, 18 LAB. LAW. 291, 306 (2002).
216. Parmet, supra note 82, at 55.
217. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638 (stating that "the plain meaning of the word 'major' denotes
comparative importance") (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939-40 (1st Cir. 1997)).
218. Parmet, supra note 82, at 80; see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471,482 (1999).
219. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196-97 (2002).
Despite the Toyota Court's heavy reliance on the actual words of the
ADA as defined by Webster's Dictionary,220 the text of the ADA certainly is
not crystal clear and cannot be made so by simply consulting a dictionary. 2
The ADA's key terms-major life activity, substantial limitation, and
reasonable accommodation-are extraordinarily ambiguous and open to
interpretation.2 2 It is unfortunate that the Toyota Court interpreted these
ambiguous words in a way that rendered the ADA highly ineffective, under
the guise of "plain meaning" jurisprudence.224
VI. IMPACT
The Toyota opinion is "full of nuances, which ... [will] be the subject
of discussions for many years to come., 225 Toyota will have effects in the
judicial arena and, as the lower courts' probable interpretation of disability
becomes apparent to human resource managers and labor lawyers, also in
the workplace. 2 6  This section first describes Toyota's effects on lower
courts' treatment of ADA lawsuits and then considers the practical impact
on the workplace.
A. Judicial Impact
The Toyota decision is a clear indication that the Supreme Court
interprets the ADA much more narrowly than the EEOC regulations would
suggest that it should be interpreted.2 27 The effect of the decision is to "curb
the breath of the ADA by requiring strict interpretation of the law's key
definition of 'disability,' potentially limiting the number of persons who
meet the definition in much the same way as did the Court's trio of ADA
decisions in 1999.-228 The limitation is so severe that bringing an ADA
employment discrimination claim is "increasingly futile.,
229
220. Id. at 196 (relying "first and foremost" on the words used in the definition of disability).
221. Parmet, supra note 82, at 81.
222. See Estlund, supra note 215, at 306.
224. Id. at 308.
225. Parry, supra note 12, at 15.
226. Id.
227. Delikat, supra note 166, at 77.
228. Id. at 75-76; see also John M. Husband, The U.S. Supreme Court Toyota Case: Further
Limits to the ADA, 31 COLO. LAW. 65, 65 (2002) (noting that the Court "continued the trend toward
reducing the possible impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act").
229. Reinert & Mahusky, supra note 165, at 39.
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1. Lower courts may be unwilling to hold that carpal tunnel syndrome
or similar physical impairments are disabilities, no matter how
severe these impairments are.
Toyota did not hold that carpal tunnel syndrome is never a disability.23 °
It is theoretically possible for carpal tunnel and physical impairments with
similar symptoms to qualify as disabilities if they are severe enough.23'
However, in practice it is highly unlikely that lower courts will find that
plaintiffs are disabled because of carpal tunnel syndrome.232 This is true for
two reasons, which are aptly illustrated by the cases of Richard v. United
States Postal Service 33 and Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers.3
a. Richard v. United States Postal Service
The first reason is that it is hard to imagine a case of carpal tunnel
syndrome that is severe enough to qualify as a disability using Toyota's very
high standard.235 The impairment at issue in Richard was not actually carpal
tunnel, but manifested itself in similar symptoms such as limited motion and
pain in the arm. 36 The Richard plaintiff suffered from ulnar nerve damage
and was diagnosed with a 30% disability in his left shoulder, arm, and
hand.237 He had difficulty dressing himself, required assistance to bathe
some body parts, could not do household chores that required pushing,
pulling or reaching with his left hand, and was not able to pick up his
children. 238 In a mere one paragraph of analysis,23 9 the federal district court
reasoned that the plaintiff's limitations were similar to Williams' limitations
in Toyota, and thus held that he was not disabled.240
230. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
231. Adrianne C. Mazura & Christy M. Young, FMLA and ADA: Recent Developments, PRAC. L.
INST.: LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, Sept., 2002, at 236, 257.
232. Id. at 257-58.
233. 219 F. Supp. 2d 172, 175 (D.N.H. 2002).
234. 261 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2002). Other recent carpal tunnel cases in which the courts have
found no disability exists as a matter of law include Heimann v. Roadway Express, Inc., 228 F.
Supp. 2d 886 (N.D. I11. 2002) (plaintiff who suffered from carpal tunnel for over a year and required
surgery on both hands held not disabled); Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 2002 WL 391348 (D. Minn.
Mar. 8, 2002) (rejecting ADA claim because carpal tunnel plaintiff was limited only in performing
work-related tasks and not in performing tasks central to daily life); Serrano v. Terence Cardinal
Cooke Health Care Ctr., 2002 WL 31027183 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2002) (carpal tunnel not a
disability because plaintiff was still able to perform most work functions even though the injury
"complicated [her] ability to perform daily functions ").
235. Mazura & Young, supra note 231, at 257-58.
236. Richard v. United States Postal Serv., 219 F. Supp. 2d 172, 175 (D.N.H. 2002).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 179.
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The Richard decision seems correct under the Toyota standard because
Richard's limitations were indeed quite comparable to the Toyota Court's
description of Williams' impairments.24' However, this standard is
unrealistically high; it defies common sense to claim that a plaintiff who
cannot bathe himself is not disabled.
b. Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc.
The second reason that lower courts may be reluctant to find that carpal
tunnel syndrome and similar impairments are disabilities is simply because
of the Court's negative reception in Toyota.242 The case of Thornton v.
McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. illustrates the interpretive gymnastics that
lower courts may perform in order to find that a plaintiff with carpal tunnel
is not disabled.243 In Thornton, the Ninth Circuit held that a newspaper
reporter with myofascial pain syndrome (injuries to the shoulders, arms, and
wrists) was not disabled.2 4 The reporter's condition was severe enough that
she was required to take a leave of absence to undergo intensive physical
therapy.245 When she returned to work, she was unable to write for more
than five minutes at a time or more than thirty minutes intermittently per
day.246 In addition, she was unable to keyboard for more than thirty minutes
at a time or more than a total of sixty minutes intermittently per day.247 The
Ninth Circuit found that Thornton was not disabled because handwriting and
keyboarding for these periods are not "activities that are of central
importance in most people's daily lives. 248  The court reasoned that
Thornton's ability to handwrite and keyboard were merely "diminished," not
"substantially limited. 249
In light of the nature and importance of handwriting and the amount that
many Americans use computers to perform essential daily tasks, the court's
assertion that these activities are not central to daily life is somewhat
incredible. In addition, the Court's distinction between "substantially
241. Compare id. at 179, with Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 202
(2002).
242. Mazura & Young, supra note 231, at 258.
243. See Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2002), modified, 292
F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) (Order Supplementing Opinion).
244. Thornton, 292 F.3d at 1046. The Ninth Circuit originally decided the case and issued an
opinion before the Supreme Court decided Toyota. See Thornton, 261 F.3d at 789.
245. Thornton, 261 F.3d at 793.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Thornton, 292 F.3d at 1046.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 1048-49 (Berzon, J., dissenting). Judge Berzon reasoned:
For many students, for most of the wide variety of employees who work at jobs that
require computer use, and for many individuals who use computers for such daily tasks
as making travel arrangements, e-mailing to friends and relatives, paying bills, filing tax
returns and other forms, and shopping, the inability to use a computer-or alternatively,
to handwrite-for more than 60 minutes total in a day could fundamentally alter the way
they live their lives ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
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limited" and "diminished" seems artificial. However, after Toyota, many
courts may prefer to engage in this type of strained analysis rather than
simply finding that a disability exists.
2. The number of cases resolved in favor of employers on motion for
summary judgment may increase.
The Toyota Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's grant of partial summary
judgment to Williams, but it did not reinstate the district court's grant of
summary judgment to Toyota because Toyota's brief did not request
reinstatement.25' Since Toyota failed to make that request, the Court was
able to carefully sidestep an issue that amici had strongly urged the Court to
address: whether the federal district court had properly applied the standard
for summary judgment.252
Trial courts frequently use, and often misuse, summary judgment to
dispose of Title I ADA cases in favor of employers by finding that the
plaintiff is not disabled as a matter of law. 3  One study of the use of
summary judgment in ADA cases showed that in 2001 federal district courts
resolved 328 Title I ADA cases.254 Employers prevailed in 314 of these
cases.255 However, employers won only 4 of these 314 victories (1.2%) after
a trial on the merits.256 The other 310 cases were dismissed on summary
judgment motions. 257  A second researcher's analysis of all publicly
available, unappealed ADA cases brought between 1992 and 1998 (under all
five titles of the ADA) revealed that 38.7% of these cases were resolved on
summary judgment in favor of employers, while only 1% were resolved on
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. 258  These studies raise serious
concern that the courts may have abused summary judgment to employees'
detriment. In addition, these numbers may understate the true problem
because plaintiffs win four times more often in published opinions than in
unpublished opinions at the district court level.259
There are two different ways in which summary judgment is being
abused.260  First, judges are refusing to send questions of fact, such as
251. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 203 (2002).
252. Amici Curiae Brief of the National Employment Lawyers Association in Support of
Respondent at 3, Toyota (No. 00-1089), 2001 WL 1023526; Amicus Brief of The National Council
on Disability in Support of Respondent at 26-27, Toyota (No. 00-1089), 2001 WL 1023525.
253. Colker, supra note 38, at 119.
254. Amy L. Allbright, 2001 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I-Survey Update, 26
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 393, 394 (2002).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 395.
257. Id. at 396.
258. Colker, supra note 38, at 126.
259. Id. at 104.
260. Id. at 101-02.
whether the plaintiff is disabled, to a jury.26 ' Second, courts are creating an
"impossibly high threshold of proof' that the plaintiff must meet in order to
survive the summary judgment motion,262 despite the fact that at summary
judgment all facts must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences must
be made in favor of the non-moving party (usually the plaintiff).263
In the present case, the district court granted summary judgment to
Toyota despite the fact that the major dispute was a question of fact--
whether Williams was "substantially limited."26  The district court also
imposed a high burden of proof on Williams and did not make all reasonable
inferences in Williams' favor.265 In addition, the district court ruled that
Williams did not offer any evidence regarding the nature and severity of her
impairment even though she had presented her doctor's reports and medical
records.266 In short, Toyota presented an opportunity in which the Supreme
Court could have addressed the problem of improperly granted summary
judgments.267 The Court's failure to address the issue is an implicit approval
of the lower court's handling of the case.268 As a result, the number of
summary judgments granted to employers may increase even more. 269 At
the very least, courts that are inclined to grant summary judgments will be
encouraged to do so because of the Supreme Court's extreme emphasis in
Toyota on creating a rigorous standard for ADA plaintiffs.27 °
261. Id. at 101. This situation is clearly illustrated by Katz v City Metal Co., Inc. In Katz, the trial
court judge first refused to let the plaintiff's doctor testify for procedural reasons, and then granted
the employer's summary judgment motion with the following comments:
In order for the Plaintiff to recover in this case, the Plaintiff must make a showing that he
has some type of permanent impairment .... The only evidence is that he has a blocked
artery that was opened up by balloon angioplasty .... People recover from heart attacks
and go on with life's functions. I know, I've done it, and I had an artery that was
completely blocked and not reopened .... I have decided it as a matter of law. I have
decided the Plaintiff failed to prove that he had a permanent disability resulting from his
heart attack.
Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1996). The court of appeals reversed and
remanded the case for trial. Id.
262. Colker, supra note 38, at 102.
263. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
264. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196-97 (2002); see also Colker,
supra note 38, at 114 (stating that whether a plaintiff is substantially limited is a decision for the
jury).
265. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America in Support of
Respondent at 10-11, Toyota (No. 00-1089), 2001 WL 1023524.
266. Id.
267. ld.at9-10.
268. See id.
269. John W. Parry, Highlights, 26 MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 387, 389 (2002);
see also Allbright, supra note 254, at 395 (noting that between January and June of 2002,
immediately after the Toyota decision, the number of ADA decisions on the merits involving the
definition of disability decreased even further).
270. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197 (stating that "these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create
a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled").
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3. Use of the argument that working is a major life activity will slowly
decrease.
Following the dictum in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. questioning
whether working is a major life activity, the circuit courts were thrown into
confusion regarding this issue.2 1' Four circuits have addressed the issue
since the Toyota opinion was handed down and they have come to three
different conclusions. In E.E.O.C. v. Gallagher Co., the Fifth Circuit
unequivocally held that working is a major life activity.272 The court
reasoned that this is true because "[flor many, working is necessary for self-
sustenance .... The choice of an occupation often provides the opportunity
for self-expression and for contribution to productive society .... jobs are
an important element of how we define ourselves and how we are perceived
by others., 273 The Fifth Circuit felt that the plain language of the ADA
compelled this result and therefore did not decide what amount of deference
should be given to the EEOC regulations. 74 Citing Gallagher, the Second
Circuit also held that working is a major life activity. 275  The Eleventh
Circuit has stated simply that, until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, it
will stand by its precedent treating working as a major life activity. 276 Most
recently, the D.C. Circuit discussed this issue at length, but then declined to
make a decision.
2 77
The Court's repetition of this question in Toyota is sure to rouse further
debate about whether or not working is a major life activity, and the
uncertainty may lead the courts to take working claims less seriously or
consider them only as a last resort.278 Because working is the life activity
most frequently relied upon by ADA plaintiffs, courts' reluctance to
entertain working claims will further reduce ADA plaintiffs' already
minuscule success rate.279 In addition, after Toyota, there is the potential
271. See E.E.O.C. v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 654 (5th Cir. 1999); Mullins v. Crowell,
228 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000); Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 226 F.3d 69,
80 (2d Cir. 2000); Duncan v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1117-18 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (Randolph, J., concurring).
272. Gallagher, 181 F.3d at 654-55.
273. Id. at 654.
274. Id. at 654 n.5.
275. Bartlett, 226 F.3d at 80.
276. Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000).
277. Duncan v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1117-18 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(Randolph, J., concurring). The D.C. Circuit court pointed out that if working is a major life
activity, whether a plaintiff is disabled or not will depend partly upon factors such as the job market,
and that a definition of disability that depends on such factors is not easy to apply. Id. at 1118.
However, the court also pointed out that the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000), School
Board of Nassau County, Florida. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), and Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624 (1998), all seemed to accept working as a major life activity. Id. at 1117.
278. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194-98 (2002) (hinting that
working is not a major life activity).
279. Annas, supra note 57, at 850-51.
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that one circuit might take the hint from the Court and hold that working is
not a major life activity, which would greatly reduce the number of persons
that could even bring suit under the ADA in that circuit. 280 The result would
be a wide geographic disparity in the amount of protection the ADA
offers. 8 1
B. Workplace Effects
The Toyota decision is a "significant legal victory" for employers. 82
Because carpal tunnel syndrome nearly always interferes with the
performance of some manual tasks, a decision in favor of Williams would
have essentially made carpal tunnel a per se disability. 283 Therefore, a
decision for Williams would have dramatically increased the number of
employees who employers have a duty to reasonably accommodate.284
Instead, the opposite is true.285 Because the Court raised the standard that
plaintiffs must meet to qualify as disabled, the number of employees who are
entitled to reasonable accommodation under the ADA will decrease.286
The Toyota opinion provides employers with a more concrete, easily
applied test than was previously available for determining whether an
employee has a manual task disability, so that employers can correctly
decide if they must provide reasonable accommodation.287
Toyota teaches that employers should focus not only on what
employees cannot do, but on what they can do. Thus, when
assessing an employee's claim that he is disabled and/or needs an
accommodation, employers should ask questions of the employee,
and/or request medical documentation, with the aim of establishing
their ability, as well as their inability, to perform important
289
activities.
Of course, gathering detailed information on employees is expensive and
time consuming, and so employers' costs may increase, especially in cases
that end in litigation. 90
All of these effects assume that plaintiffs will continue to sue for
employment discrimination under the ADA. However, some states have
discrimination laws that define disability more broadly and provide more
280. See Allbright, supra note 254, at 395.
281. See id.
282. Delikat, supra note 166, at 77.
283. Danaher, supra note 157, at 19.
284. Id. at 19.
285. Delikat, supra note 166, at 77.
286. Id.
287. id. at 77-78.
289. Id.
290. See Borkowski, et al., supra note 160, at 17.
292. Richard J. Reibstein & Rachael A. Akohonae, Provisions of New York Laws are Likely to
Diminish Impact of High Court Disability Decisions, N.Y. ST. B.J., October 2002, at 47, 48.
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protections to employees than the ADA.292 For example, New York statute
defines disability as "a physical, mental, or medical impairment... which
prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by
medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques. 2 93  New
York law does not require a substantial limitation on a major life activity. 94
Williams would clearly be disabled under New York law. 295 In states like
New York, Toyota will have little practical effect on the workplace because
employers will still be held to more stringent state non-discrimination
standards.296
It is clear that employers will benefit from Toyota, but at what cost to
individual employees? The Toyota decision sets such a high standard for
disability that it creates a "[c]atch-22" situation for many individuals. 98
Plaintiff Ella Williams' situation aptly illustrates this catch-22 and its
potentially devastating effects. 299 For several years, Williams was physically
able, despite her struggles with carpal tunnel syndrome, to satisfactorily
perform her assembly line job.3 °° It was only when new tasks were added to
her position that her symptoms worsened, causing her to request the
reasonable accommodation of returning to her previous job. 30 1  Toyota
refused to let Williams return to her old job and forced her to continue
performing the tasks that were causing her injuries.30 2 Faced with few
choices, Williams continued working, which exacerbated her condition until
she was clearly "disabled" enough to invoke the protections of the ADA.30 3
But by that time, the ADA could not help her because she was no longer
physically capable of working at all.3°
As Williams' story illustrates, Toyota's unreasonable standard places
employees in an impossible situation: many individuals are impaired enough
that they are unable to work without some accommodation, but not impaired
enough to receive accommodation under the Toyota standard.30 5 This places
293. Id. at 47 (citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21)(a) (McKinney 2003)).
294. Id.
295. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 192 (2002).
296. Reibstein & Akohonae, supra note 292, at 47.
298. Annas, supra note 57, at 843; see also Sheil, supra note 93, at 326 (commenting that workers
with carpal tunnel syndrome are faced with either working in extreme pain or being chronically
unemployed).
299. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 188-90.
300. Id. at 189.
301. Id.
302. Id. This fact was disputed by Toyota. For illustrative purposes, we accept Williams' version
of the facts just as the trial court must do on a motion for summary judgment.
303. Id. at 189-90.
304. Id. at 190.
305. Annas, supra note 57, at 843.
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the burden on the employee to choose either to stop working, or to continue
working and risk further injury, which, ironically, may make the employee
impaired enough for reasonable accommodation.3 °6 The burden is on the
employee even when, as in Williams' case, an employer could easily offer
an alternative that would allow the individual to continue to work and be a
productive part of society.30 7 Williams' story is not unique.30 8 Following
Toyota, many more similarly situated individuals may become caught in this
catch-22 situation and become unable to work.30 9 This result is clearly
incompatible with the ADA's goals of "full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency ' 3 0 and reduction of "unnecessary
expenses resulting from... nonproductivity."3 ''
VII. CONCLUSION
"The ADA appears radically different than it did just a few years ago,"
in large measure because of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Toyota.3t 2 Despite a legislative history that clearly demonstrates the
intention of the ADA's drafters to act expansively to eliminate
discrimination against all those who are disabled, the Supreme Court has
chosen to limit the statute's protections to only a few. 3 13  With the
unanimous Toyota decision following in the path of the Sutton trilogy, the
Court has undoubtedly charted its course and will likely continue to narrow
and limit the ADA.31 4 This means that for lower courts an expansive reading
of the ADA is no longer legally supportable, even though socially
desirable." 5
Congress could attempt to repair the Court's damage to the ADA by
amending the Act.316 However, it would be very difficult, if not impossible,
to define disability in a way that removes subjectivity-and thus puts the
definition beyond the Court's reach-but still employs a case-by-case
analysis. Because Congress felt strongly that a case-by-case analysis was
306. See id.
307. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 188 (noting that Williams had performed two tasks at the Toyota
plant for three years without difficulty, and that she had asked to be reassigned to those tasks).
308. For example, in Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, plaintiff, a foam board cutter, developed work
related injuries to his hands. Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, 234 F.3d 1219, 1220-21 (1 lth Cir. 2000).
After being denied reassignment to at least two other positions for which he was qualified, he
continued in his foam board cutting position until he was unable to use his right hand to grasp, lift,
turn, or write. Id. He was then discharged for inability to perform the job. Id. See also Sheil, supra
note 93, at 328, 332 (noting that almost half of all occupational injuries are due to carpal tunnel
syndrome or other related injuries and that employees are filing an increasing number of
discrimination claims after being denied reasonable accommodation for these impairments).
309. Annas, supra note 57, at 848.
310. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000).
311. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (2000).
312. See Reinert & Mahusky, supra note 165, at 39.
313. See discussion supra Part V.
314. See Delikat, supra note 166, at 77-78.
315. See Parry, supra note 12, at 15.
316. Parmet, supra note 82, at 88.
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important when it enacted the ADA in 1990, it is unlikely that it would now
be willing to dispense with this requirement.3t 8 Another option would be to
adopt New York's state law approach and define disability so broadly that
anyone with any impairment is included.31 9 However, this would likely
increase employers' costs significantly.32 0 In 1990, Congress was very
aware of the need to balance employers' concerns with the ADA's goals,
and Congress would probably believe that this option places too great a
burden on employers.322 In addition, it is politically inadvisable to attempt
to amend the ADA in the current uncertain, economics-focused political
climate, because ground might be lost rather than gained.32 3 These factors
suggest that any action in Congress to amend the ADA will have to wait for
another day.
Two questions remain unanswered after Toyota: Is working a major life
activity? Will the Supreme Court intervene and establish clear, consistent,
and equitable standards for granting summary judgment in ADA cases? 32
4
Meanwhile, advocates of disability rights can only hope that when the Court
chooses to answer these questions, it will do so in a way that is more
consistent with the history and purpose of the ADA than recent decisions
have been.
Andrea Kloehn Naef
3 25
318. See discussion supra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
319. See discussion supra notes 292-296 and accompanying text.
320. See generally Argun M. Ulgen, From Household Bathrooms to the Workplace: Bringing the
Americans with Disabilities Act Back to Where It Belongs: An Analysis of Toyota Motor
Manufacturing v. Williams, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 761, 767 (2003).
322. See discussion supra Part II(A).
323. See Tucker, supra note 82, at 373-74.
324. See discussion supra Part VI(A).
325. J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law, May 2004.
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